This paper explores a paradox. On the one hand it is believed that 9/11 rekindled the UK-US special relationship, but at the same time it has been argued that British mismanagement of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan caused relations to deteriorate. Whilst I agree with part of this analysis in that Iraq represented a nadir in Anglo American relations I believe Afghanistan did not follow this trajectory. A wide range of factors help to explain this change in fortune, but I focus on the role played by the British military in restoring the trust and confidence of its US counterpart and argue that this institutional relationship was and is a vital component in the Anglo American Alliance. 
Introduction
There is in Britain a rich literature on Anglo American relations.
ii In general these writings have focused on the extent to which the United Kingdom (UK) has enjoyed a special or privileged position of influence with the United States (US) foreign policy making process.
Within this context, discussion has centred on such questions as what constitutes a special relationship, when did this relationship begin, why did it assume the character that it did and how do we explain its peaks and troughs. However, underlying much of this debate is a deeper question which concentrates on the perceived decline in the utility of the UK as an ally to the US and what can and should be done to prevent this diminution in status.
iii This paper touches upon these issues, but within the dynamic setting of the war on terror and specifically Britain's recent intervention in Afghanistan.
Given the overcrowded state of the political and academic market on this topic it is important to justify why yet another piece is required on this subject. I believe analysis of this kind is warranted because the special relationship remains at the heart of the UK's foreign and security policy and will continue to do so in the future iv . As such, there are important lessons to be learned from how the alliance operated during the war in Afghanistan. This is important because it might help avoid the problems which it is argued came to plague the special relationship during the war on terror and could do so again in current conflicts involving both the UK and US militarily. This view was expressed most bluntly by Patrick Porter who argued the UK's alliance with the US suffered directly as a consequence of these two conflicts. Instead of reinforcing the special relationship:
The two wars in the 'war on terror ' did not stop the Taliban from making inroads into the province. In fact, so strong was their presence that the British were challenged to operate beyond the immediate confines of their fortified bases. viii As a result, they struggled to provide security for the Afghan people.
The UK Foreign Affairs Committee in its report of 2010 also acknowledged tensions between the US and UK in the conduct of military operations in Afghanistan, which when added to other areas of dispute brought into question the notion that there was a special relationship. Further evidence of that success was confirmed by Malcolm Chalmers who noted that an important ingredient in the conduct of this war was the quality of the institutional relationship which emerged between the US and UK militaries, a view which challenges the narrative set out by Porter and others. xii Given the legacy of Iraq, and the even more pressing problems which emerged in Afghanistan, it is important to explain why and how the British military were able to achieve greater cooperation. Certainly these differences in outcome suggest that we need to look beyond a traditional understanding of the special relationship. As such, this paper focuses on how the British and Americans were able to reconstruct their political relationship via their respective military institutions. Whilst it looks at the Afghan campaign in its entirety the main focus is on the period after 2008 when first the UK and then the US undertook to review their strategy in Afghanistan. xiii What it reveals is how sentiment and realpolitik at the political/strategic level impacted for good or ill on the day to day working relationship of the UK and US military. However, institutional structures also emerged in Afghanistan which served to facilitate and reconcile the tensions between these allies. The remainder of this paper will briefly explore the state of the debate on Anglo American relations and the extent to which they help us to understand UK-US relations in time of war. The paper will then consider why UK-US relations suffered in Iraq and Afghanistan and this will then be followed by a more detailed analysis of how British and American cooperation improved in the Afghan campaign. I should stress that the lion's share of this paper focuses on the UK perspective of the special relationship. This was a conscious decision based on the recognition that as
Burke explains: `the concept of a "special relationship" is very problematic, in that, in general, it is the weaker power which needs it: the stronger power tends to get what it wants without such supplication.' xiv In essence, special relationships are primarily the preserve of the weaker party, which is why it seemed sensible to focus the debate from the perspective of the UK. One further question that needs to be addressed is why, given the range of relations the UK has with the US have I chosen to focus on defence rather than say intelligence? The answer quite simply is because it is asserted that it is the most important and enduring aspect of the institutional connections linking the UK and US. Certainly this was the view of Baylis, who argued that the defence/security dimension was the defining trait of the Anglo American relationship. 
Centrifugal Forces which impacted on the UK-US Special Relationship in Afghanistan
The debate over Iraq set out above illustrates a general problem which characterises any deliberation on the special relationship: how do you provide a metric which allows more than an impressionistic measure of its peaks and troughs. Looking at this issue in the context of a war does however provide a partial solution to this problem as the principal issues and debates often assume a more tangible form because there is so much more at stake for each ally. For example, we can determine how far the political goals of the allies in war converge or not. Similarly, we can also assess the extent to which there is common agreement and understanding on how military power is to be employed to achieve the goals of this war. Finally, war often helps crystallise our thoughts regarding the risks accepted by each ally and the costs they are willing to pay to ensure strategic success.
If we apply this metric to Iraq we can see there was a strong agreement on the political aims of the war, but apparently some concern within the UK over the post war reconstruction plan and the subsequent way in which the US used its military power to stabilise Iraq and restore national governance. Similarly, whilst willing to take the lead for security and development in MND SE, the British proved unwilling to increase the risks they faced by deploying forces to assist their American ally in more violent parts of the country and even in MND SE casualties became an increasingly sensitive political issue in the UK. They also offered to take charge until another nation could be found to act as the lead nation. The American position acknowledged the need for a peacekeeping force but, because of an innate hostility to the use of US troops in nation building and peacekeeping, they preferred other nations to take on this role. 
Centripetal Forces which sustained alliance cohesion in Afghanistan
What then happened in Afghanistan which allowed a closer and more effective working relationship between the UK and US military? In my view the elements that made up the special relationship provided a permissive environment within which to engender a close working alliance in both Iraq and Afghanistan, but a specific sequence of events helped bring this to the fore in the latter conflict. In essence, a catalyst was created which allowed the British to exploit the generic benefits of the special relationship in Kabul and Helmand.
The first point I would make here is that the intangibles of the special relationship, which focus on a sense of shared history, understanding of the US and most importantly language, did play a part in helping the UK to make itself indispensable to the US in Afghanistan.
However, as one British Colonel explained, whilst this facilitated and eased social relations in a US dominated chain of command it did not guarantee influence. This required British officers to demonstrate their competence as staff officers or in the field of operations, depending on where they were deployed. In his view, the British usually excelled because, in contrast to their American counterparts, their training was diverse and comprehensive. This stemmed not from some innate martial superiority of the British but from the fact that, because the British army was so small, its officer corps could not role specialise in the way US army officers could. In sum, British officers possessed a good understanding of formation level planning as a whole and this enabled them to demonstrate their value in a large headquarters.
In addition, he also believed the British were careful when choosing their posts in the US chain of command. lxxv Thus, even though in the later stages of the war in Helmand, the British provided one third of the force, they accounted for only 15-20% of posts in the regional command headquarters. However, these posts allowed the British to maintain influence in an American dominated chain of command. lxxvi Obviously, these observations can be extended to the British military's time in Iraq and this suggests that, whilst these connections gave the British a comparative advantage, they were not enough to sustain the military relationship. However, other factors discussed below served to increase the importance of both these elements of UK US military cooperation in Afghanistan.
There were three important differences in terms of how the UK US alliance was managed in Afghanistan which I believe made a fundamental difference in terms of countering centrifugal forces present in Afghanistan. The first and most important was the fact that, in contrast to Iraq, the British were not looking to withdraw from Afghanistan but rather to expand their role provided by the UK, but also where they were located which enhanced their importance.
Although only one percent of the Afghan population lived in Helmand it became the principal frontline in this war. As a result, the British had a prominent position in U.S. strategy.
Equally important, the level of the threat in Helmand meant that the British were automatically exposed to a high degree of risk and required help from their allies. Of particular importance here is how the UK's sacrifices compared to those of its NATO/ISAF allies. A persistent cause of friction between the US and its allies was the belief that America was bearing the burden of this war virtually alone. lxxix However, the US military also recognised `that the UK, Dutch and Canadians had carried the brunt of the fight in the south' with no support from nations like Germany or France. lxxx In contrast, in Iraq the British were in a relatively benign zone of occupation, but were constantly being asked to reinforce US forces involved in heavy fighting elsewhere. As has been said, such requests were politely declined and inevitably this became a source of friction. As important were structural and procedural changes which took place within the theatre of operations, which provided a mechanism through which to implement the new plan. In addition it also served to reanimate the conceptual and institutional linkages between the UK and US military. In 2009 ISAF was composed of 42 nations which together deployed 61,000 troops within five regional commands. In addition, there were a further 57,000 US troops fighting under a different chain of command within OEF lxxxvi . All of these elements were fighting their own separate wars and consequently one of the basic maxims of war was not followed, i.e. the need to link tactical actions to achieve strategic effect. The absence of a higher authority above the regional commands allowed the British, for example, to subvert ISAF orders when they conflicted with UK objectives such as the need to avoid UK casualties. It took some time and a lot of effort to work out how the USMC functioned. In this case, the command and control function, the processes, right down to the basics of what do they expect, how do you bid for resources, how to play the game; play by their rules of their game rather than our own. We got very good at it; we were outperforming our counterparts in Task Force Leatherneck when it came to bidding for resources or submitting CONOPS. Clinton, who agreed this should be done.
xcix
According to a British officer who served in the USMC headquarters in Helmand, the British army and the USMC, in spite of the problems alluded to earlier, actually had much in common. Both were small and agile formations and this provided a common bond from which it was possible to build a shared understanding of what needed to be done. He described the relationship between the British army and USMC as awesome. Both institutions and personality played a key role in making things work and as a senior staff officer he felt absolutely empowered and did not feel he had an American minder looking over his shoulder. In fact the relationship was so successful that the British army looked at ways in which to maintain contact with the USMC post Afghanistan. In the end this aspiration was allowed to whither as it became clear that in the future they were more likely to work with the US army than marines. c It is also possible to argue that, even though there was little in the way of formal connections between the British army and the USMC, their training and education did provide a degree of connectivity and a common ground for cooperation in that they followed similar training and educational programmes, which allowed close cooperation with the US army.
Another important reason why UK US military cooperation worked so well in Helmand was because of the investment made in training with the USMC. In the view of one British officer training was more important than any long standing institutional connection. He found the pre deployment training he did with the Americans before going to Afghanistan extremely important. It ensured you understood the American planning system and battle rhythm of the 400 staff in RC South West. ci A large number of British staff officers did the training before deploying but some did not and, in his view, those who did not struggled to get into this working rhythm. One of the problems which made it difficult to provide this level of training more widely was that British policy is for soldiers to do 6 month tours. This stipulation limits how much training can be done before being deployed. In addition personnel tend not to be identified until near the time of their deployment. Shortage of time thus limited how long they could spend on training if they were going to do a six month tour.
Finally, the British army gapped posts for officers of the rank of lieutenant colonel and below, which meant unit commanders were reluctant to release staff until the very last minute. He was unusual in that he had disbanded his regiment and then had several months free before going to Afghanistan. This allowed him to go to the US for longer than normal and to commit to serving in Afghanistan for twelve months. He also pointed out that, although both the UK and US are close allies and members of NATO there still existed significant security walls between US and UK forces and it took time to sort out security clearances. This has become extremely important in an age when everything is done on computer and he believed the UK should maintain a pool of officers with the necessary clearances to work in a US headquarters in the future. This problem was particularly acute in the domain of tactical and operational intelligence.
A certain synergy also emerged between the USMC and UK forces over the four years of their deployment in Helmand. As a result, a high degree of integration was achieved in even the most sensitive areas of activity between the British and Americans. Perhaps the best illustration of this was the decision to combine the US and UK targeting cells, which existed to provide intelligence on insurgent activity. This capability relied heavily on the generation of information capabilities which states and militaries sometimes do not want to share with even their closest ally. However it became logical to combine rather than duplicate this activity in Helmand, and whilst it still took six months to bring about this merger a combined targeting cell was created. This was cited as evidence of how closely integrated the British and Americans became in Helmand.
cii Whilst the effort made to promote greater unity of command within RC South and then RC South West reduced the autonomy of the British it did address an important source of friction. As has been said, the principal difference between UK and US relations in Afghanistan compared to Iraq was that the British were prepared to integrate themselves in a US chain of command. It is also important recognise that the creation of unified command structure was not a silver bullet and it seems PJHQ continued to be a thorn in the side of the US led chain of command in RC South West and the problem of national politics did not go away. However, having British officers serving as deputy commander ISAF, deputy commander IJC and deputy commander of RC South West provided a filter through which requests from PJHQ and the American chain of command could be transmitted in a way that was more measured and balanced. Of particular importance here was the willingness of the national contingent commander to conduct a more equal dialogue with London regarding some of their requests.
Conclusion
In this essay I have looked at the special relationship largely through the eyes of the British.
It has set out, but not challenged the basic assumptions that have shaped and driven UK foreign policy on this subject over many decades. My main goal has been to explore how the British sought to sustain this relationship within the demanding environment of the war on terror. Of particular interest here is the way in which the cohesion of the alliance oscillated between Iraq and Afghanistan. Within this context I have challenged the notion that, like Iraq, the war in Afghanistan caused significant harm to the alliance. In my view, although the alliance in Afghanistan experienced many of the same problems as Iraq, the relationship did not follow the same trajectory. If this proposition is accepted we then need to explain this variation. In my view, whilst I accept sentiment and interest played a part in shaping UK-US relations the fact that both variables had a constant presence over the span of the war on terror suggests the cause of this variation is to be found elsewhere. An important difference between Iraq and Afghanistan was extent to which the allies institutionalised their relations within the campaign. What allowed the benefits of this association to flourish in Afghanistan rather than Iraq was the joint commitment by the UK and US to the successful conclusion of this war by 2014. Equally important, and again in contrast to Iraq, there was an agreement between the US and British militaries on the best strategy and operational plan to achieve this goal, a view which drew heavily on a common training and education in the UK and US Finally, if we accept the proposition that the British military succeeded in its mission of redeeming itself in the eyes of its most important ally in Afghanistan we also need to assess the extent to which this allowed the UK to shape or influence US policy. Such thinking is, in part, an historical legacy stemming from the Second World War and, in particular, the success of the British at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 where they got their more powerful ally to commit to a grand strategy which suited British rather than American 
